Italy’s Citizenship Reform Reaches the EU Court: What the Picuso Case (C-816/26) Means for Descendants

Italy’s Citizenship Reform Reaches the EU Court: What the Picuso Case (C-816/26) Means for Descendants

A major development — read the caveat first

On 23 July 2026, Italy’s Constitutional Court (Corte costituzionale) referred a central part of Italy’s 2025 citizenship-by-descent reform to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The referral has been registered in Luxembourg as Case C-816/26, which the CJEU has anonymised under the invented name “Picuso.”

For the millions of people of Italian descent who saw their path to citizenship narrowed or closed by the 2025 reform, this is the most significant legal development since the reform itself. It is also, for exactly that reason, the development most likely to be misreported and oversold.

So the single most important sentence in this article comes first: this case is pending, and no decision has been made. A referral is a question, not an answer. The CJEU has been asked whether part of the reform is compatible with EU law; it has not ruled, and it may rule either way. Anyone telling you that Italian citizenship “is coming back” retroactively, or that you should file now because a favourable outcome is assured, is getting ahead of the facts. What follows is what actually happened, what was actually asked, and what it does — and does not — mean for your situation.

Note. This article reflects the Constitutional Court’s official communiqué of 23 July 2026 and the procedural status of Case C-816/26 as reported at the time of writing. Court procedure and timelines evolve; case law is decided only when the CJEU rules. This is general information, not legal advice on your individual case.

Background: what the 2025 reform changed

To understand the referral, you need to understand the provision under review.

For decades, Italian citizenship by descent (jure sanguinis) operated on a principle of, in effect, unlimited transmission by filiation: citizenship passed from parent to child down the generations, with no generational cap, subject to the well-known technical rules (no naturalisation of the ascendant before the next descendant’s birth, the “1948 rule” for maternal lines, and so on).

In 2025 the Italian government intervened by decree. Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, later converted into Law No. 74 of 2025 (“Urgent provisions on citizenship”), inserted a new Article 3-bis into Law No. 91 of 1992, the framework citizenship statute. The provision at the heart of the referral does something striking: it provides that, by way of derogation from the prior rules on unlimited transmission, a person “is considered never to have acquired Italian citizenship” if they were born abroad — even before the article entered into force — and hold another citizenship, unless one of a limited set of conditions applies.

According to the Constitutional Court’s communiqué, those saving conditions are:

• the person’s status as a citizen was recognised (administratively or judicially) following an application filed by 23:59 on 27 March 2025;
• a parent or grandparent holds, or held at the time of death, exclusively Italian citizenship; or
• a parent or adoptive parent was resident in Italy for at least two continuous years after acquiring Italian citizenship and before the child’s birth or adoption.

The practical effect is twofold and severe. It sets a hard cut-off date for applications already in the pipeline, and — this is the contested part — it operates retroactively, treating people born abroad as if they had never been Italian, rather than removing a status going forward.

What the Constitutional Court actually did on 23 July 2026

The referral did not come out of nowhere. It arose from proceedings brought before the Tribunale di Mantova and the Tribunale di Campobasso, where the new Article 3-bis was applied and challenged. The Tribunale di Campobasso, in particular, questioned the provision for breaching Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) — the provisions that confer EU citizenship on anyone who holds the citizenship of a Member State.

The referring judge relied on a line of CJEU case law under which national rules that deprive a person of citizenship must include an individual examination of the consequences for the person’s life, in line with the principle of proportionality. In other words: a Member State cannot strip someone of citizenship — and with it EU citizenship — by an automatic, one-size-fits-all rule, without weighing what that means for the individual.

Here is the nuance that most coverage misses, and that matters for calibrating expectations. The Constitutional Court had already addressed this EU-law argument at the national level and rejected it, in its judgment No. 63 of 2026. There, the Court held that the CJEU case law invoked concerned situations where a Member State had deprived someone of an already-established status — an accepted, exercisable citizenship — whereas Article 3-bis, in its view, prevents the original acquisition of a status that was never concretely established or exercised. On that reasoning, the Court considered there was no deprivation of an existing EU citizenship at all.

Why, then, refer the question to Luxembourg after rejecting it at home? Because interpretation of EU law is ultimately not Italy’s call. The Court referred the matter in deference to the principle of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU) and the CJEU’s exclusive competence to give the definitive interpretation of Union law. It is a careful, institutionally correct move — but note what it signals: the Constitutional Court is not endorsing the challenge. It is submitting a question on which it has already expressed a sceptical national view, and letting the EU Court have the final word. That is a meaningful data point for anyone trying to guess the outcome.

The exact question referred

Stripped of procedure, the Constitutional Court asked the CJEU (translated from the official Italian text):

whether Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU preclude the adoption of a rule such as Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992, introduced by Article 1(1) of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025 as converted, insofar as it creates an original preclusion to the acquisition of Italian citizenship for a person born abroad — even before that article entered into force — who holds another citizenship, save where one of the conditions set out in the same provision applies.

The framing is deliberate. The Court did not ask, broadly, “is the reform lawful?” It asked a precise question about whether EU citizenship law tolerates an “original preclusion” (preclusione originaria) — a bar on ever acquiring citizenship — as opposed to a deprivation of a citizenship already held. That distinction between never acquiring and being deprived is the legal fault line on which the case will likely turn.

What “Picuso” and Case C-816/26 mean procedurally

Once a national court refers a question, the CJEU registers it as a new case with its own number — here, C-816/26. The name “Picuso” is not a party’s real name: it is a fictitious label the CJEU created to protect the privacy of the individuals involved, consistent with the Court’s anonymisation practice. So “the Picuso case” and “C-816/26” are the same thing.

Procedurally, the case has entered the written-observations phase: after the referral was registered, the CJEU made an official summary available and opened a window (reported at roughly 70 days) during which the parties, the Italian government, the European Commission, and other Member States may file written submissions. After that come — in the normal course — a possible hearing, an Advocate General’s Opinion, and finally the judgment of the Court.

Realistically, this takes time. Preliminary-ruling proceedings commonly run well over a year from referral to judgment, and can be longer; an expedited procedure is possible but not guaranteed. Anyone planning around this case should assume a multi-quarter to multi-year horizon, not an imminent result.

What it means for you — practically, and without overpromising

The honest answer depends entirely on which group you fall into, and even then it is about preserving options, not predicting victory.

If your recognition was already granted, or your application was filed by the 27 March 2025 cut-off. You sit within one of the saving conditions the provision itself carves out. Your position is comparatively more settled, though it is always worth confirming that your file genuinely qualifies under the exception as worded.

If you have a judicial case currently pending. This is where the referral bites most immediately. National courts hearing jure sanguinis cases that turn on Article 3-bis may stay (suspend) proceedings to await the CJEU’s answer, since the EU-law question is now live before the Court of Justice. Whether a stay helps or hurts you depends on the specifics of your claim — some claimants benefit from waiting for clarity, others have arguments that do not depend on the referred question at all. This is a moment to review the legal basis of a pending case, not to assume it is automatically frozen or automatically saved.

If you were shut out by the reform and are wondering whether to act now. Be cautious of anyone using the referral as a reason to rush you into filing. The referral does not reopen the prior law, does not create a new right, and does not guarantee a favourable outcome. What it may do, for some profiles, is make it worth assessing now whether you have a viable legal route — either one that does not depend on Article 3-bis at all, or one where preserving a position ahead of a future ruling is genuinely advantageous. That is a case-by-case legal question, not a blanket “file now” answer.

Across all groups, the value of proper legal analysis has gone up, not down. The law is unsettled, the exceptions are technical, and the difference between a claim that survives Article 3-bis and one that does not often lies in the precise facts of a family line.

What this development is not

Because expectation-management is the responsible part of covering this story, it bears stating plainly:

• It is not a ruling. The CJEU has been asked a question; it has not answered it.
• It is not a restoration of the pre-2025 unlimited-transmission rule.
• It is not a guarantee of any outcome — and note that Italy’s own Constitutional Court, in judgment No. 63/2026, has already expressed the view that there is no incompatibility with EU citizenship law.
• It is not a reason to pay anyone for a “guaranteed” result tied to this case. No such guarantee is possible while the case is pending.

None of that diminishes its importance. A favourable CJEU ruling could reshape the landscape for a large number of descendants; an unfavourable one would consolidate the reform. Both possibilities are real, which is precisely why measured, fact-based planning beats hope or hype.

Frequently asked questions

What is Case C-816/26 “Picuso”?

It is the CJEU case created by the Italian Constitutional Court’s referral (Ordinance No. 147/2026) asking whether part of Italy’s 2025 citizenship reform is compatible with EU citizenship law. “Picuso” is an anonymised name the Court invented to protect the individuals’ privacy.

Does this mean Italian citizenship by descent is coming back?

No. The case is pending and no decision has been made. It may be decided either way, and the outcome is genuinely uncertain.

Which law is under review?

Article 3-bis of Law No. 91/1992, inserted by Decree-Law No. 36/2025 as converted into Law No. 74/2025 — specifically the part that treats a person born abroad with another citizenship as never having acquired Italian citizenship, subject to limited exceptions.

What exactly was the CJEU asked?

Whether Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU preclude a rule that creates an “original preclusion” to acquiring Italian citizenship for people born abroad who hold another citizenship, save where the provision’s exceptions apply.

Has Italy’s Constitutional Court taken a position?

Yes — and this is important. In judgment No. 63/2026 it had already rejected the EU-law challenge, reasoning that the case concerns never acquiring citizenship rather than being deprived of it. It referred the question to the CJEU out of respect for the EU Court’s exclusive role in interpreting EU law, not because it endorsed the challenge.

When will there be a decision?

There is no fixed date. Preliminary-ruling cases commonly take well over a year, sometimes considerably longer. Plan on a multi-quarter to multi-year horizon.

I have a pending court case — what happens now?

Your court may suspend proceedings pending the CJEU’s answer, or your claim may rest on grounds unaffected by the referred question. Which applies depends on your case; it should be reviewed individually.

Should I file an application now because of this case?

Not automatically. The referral does not create a new right or reopen the old law. Whether acting now helps depends entirely on your family line and legal position, and should be assessed case by case.

The bottom line

The Constitutional Court’s referral in Picuso (C-816/26) puts the retroactive core of Italy’s 2025 citizenship reform in front of the one court that can decide, definitively, whether it is compatible with EU citizenship. That is a genuinely consequential moment for people of Italian descent. But it is a question posed, not a question answered — and the Italian court that posed it has already signalled its own doubts about the challenge. The right response is neither despair nor premature celebration; it is a careful, individual assessment of where your family line stands, what the reform’s exceptions mean for you, and whether there is a route worth preserving while the EU Court deliberates.

If you want that assessment done properly, our firm offers a free written eligibility review by a lawyer through the contact form on this site — a clear, honest read of your position under the current law and this pending case, with no guarantees and no hype.

Prepared by Bersani Law — Avvocato (Bar of Verona), Abogado ejerciente (Bar of Madrid). This article is general information about a pending case and does not constitute legal advice. It reflects the Constitutional Court’s official communiqué of 23 July 2026 and the status of Case C-816/26 at the time of writing; the CJEU had not ruled as of publication. Individual outcomes depend on the specific facts of each family line. Always obtain advice tailored to your circumstances before acting.